China’s recent unsafe maritime interception was no accident

A Chinese J-10 fighter intercepted an Australian MH-60R Seahawk helicopter from the destroyer HMAS Hobart over the Yellow Sea on May 4, throwing flares in its path and endangering the helicopter and its crew, according to the Australian Department of Defense. With unusual haste, the ministry issued a condemning statement two days later, calling China’s recent harassment of an Australian military object unsafe and unprofessional.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese later called it “completely unacceptable.”

First and foremost, such behavior must be denounced while conducting routine and lawful operations around China’s maritime periphery. Official silence would lead to complicity in repeated misconduct. If the government understood this lesson after being criticized for its slow response to China’s dangerous use of sonar pulses against Australian divers from the frigate HMAS Toowoomba in November, then bravo.

However, this leaves a fundamental question unanswered: Why do Chinese forces persist in such risky and provocative behavior? And why are they doing this despite improving diplomatic relations with Australia and efforts by the US and its partners to develop protocols with them for safe military encounters?

China typically denies that it behaved irresponsibly in its encounters with foreign warships and aircraft. In this case, it said: “An Australian military aircraft deliberately flew close to Chinese airspace in a provocative act, endangering China’s maritime aviation security.” Nevertheless, the catalog of unsafe incidents is extensive enough to prove deliberate and organized harassment.

The behavior of the Chinese armed forces recently appeared to be more disciplined. The frequency with which their units acted unsafely near U.S. forces in the Pacific has decreased. Just before the latest incident, Chinese Navy chief Admiral Hu Zhongming hosted his regional counterparts at a naval symposium in Qingdao “to deepen the countries’ friendship, promote exchanges and strengthen mutual trust.” Australian Navy Chief Vice Admiral Mark Hammond attended.

But now two Australian warships have been involved in serious incidents within just a few months. And a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft was unsafely intercepted over the South China Sea in May 2022, just as the current Labor government came to power. It is simply implausible to claim that these incidents were spontaneous or occurred independently of China’s military chain of command.

A combination of coercive behavior, including military maneuvers, with diplomatic charm offensives is well known in China’s statecraft. India and Vietnam have experienced similar tactics over many years. Therefore, Canberra should not be surprised by the combination of blows and shoves in the current phase of supposed stabilization with Beijing.

This tactic has left China’s interlocutors unbalanced and fearful of crossing Beijing’s often unclear red lines. As with any form of bullying, remaining silent in the face of it only strengthens the bully. Therefore, Australia’s rapid, clear and measured response to the recent incident is encouraging.

China may also have had a specific motivation for the unsafe interception.

The first clue is timing. This came just days after ABC revealed that Hammond had urged his Chinese counterpart in Qingdao to prioritize security. Hammond brought up the sonar incident during their encounter.

The second clue is the operational context. While deployed in Northeast Asia, the Australian warships were involved in Operation Argos, a multinational maritime enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea. The focus of activity is on the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. In October, the Chinese Air Force unsafely intercepted a Canadian surveillance aircraft involved in the same operation.

China’s specific goal here is to dissuade US allies from continuing to physically enforce sanctions against North Korea. Many of the embargoed materials that find their way into North Korean ports, including through ship-to-ship transfers, come from China. And China’s ties to North Korea, as well as to Russia, are becoming closer.

Beijing also has Australian-specific motivations. Canberra should interpret such aggression as a show of dominance by Chinese forces, demonstrating that they can make life difficult for Australian forces wherever they deem their presence undesirable – and that they can do so dangerously if they want.

China knows how much Australia values ​​the well-being and safety of its military personnel. These incidents are testing Canberra’s resolve to continue operating in China’s maritime periphery in peacetime.

The latest could even be interpreted as a personal rebuke to Australia’s naval chief for directly questioning the professionalism and security of the Chinese military. The government should therefore be cautious about supporting Hammond. It should also preempt any Chinese notion that Canberra can be forced not only to scale back its defense operations in Northeast Asia but also to conduct more joint patrols with the US, Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

For Beijing, actions always speak louder than words.