Have drones replaced attack helicopters?

On the occasion of the termination of the helicopter-based Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program and the announced end of production of the UH-60V Black Hawk in 2025, Army Chief of Staff Randy George said in February: “We are learning on the battlefield – especially in Ukraine – that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed.”

He added: “Sensors and weapons mounted on a variety of unmanned systems and in space are more ubiquitous, have greater range and are less expensive than ever before.”

At the same press conference, the commander of the US Army Futures Command, General James Rainey, stated: “We are following events in Ukraine and Gaza very closely and are adapting because war could break out as early as tonight, this weekend.”

The announcement marked a comprehensive reassessment of the helicopter’s previously ubiquitous role as a reconnaissance, combat, transport and logistics platform on the modern battlefield.

This was all the more remarkable because the FARA program was in the final stages of a nearly 20-year search for a replacement for the Bell OH-58 Kiowa observation, response and fire support vehicle. It had already reached the stage where the last pre-selected bidders, Sikorsky and Bell, had both prototypes ready for final testing and evaluation.

What triggered this abrupt change of direction?

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Military commentator David Axe wrote in a Telegraph article at the time of the US Army’s announcement that there had been “a veritable bloodbath among helicopter pilots on both sides… the helicopter is dying, the Ukraine war is destroying it.”

Axe’s assessment was supported by figures published at the time by open-source analysis site Oryx and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which showed that Russia had lost nearly 40 percent of its attack helicopters, including its newest Ka-52 (NATO: Hokum), and nearly 20 percent of its transport fleet, while Ukraine had lost more than half of its admittedly much smaller rotorcraft fleet.

The reason for this was that military planners had no experience of a conventional war of the size and scope triggered by Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, military strategists on both sides underestimated the impact of ground-based air defenses on the modern battlefield.

Serhii Kuzan, a former adviser to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, said the lesson was amply illustrated by the huge losses and ultimate failure of the large-scale Russian helicopter raid on the Antonov airport near Hostomel. The operation, in the first week of the invasion, was intended to be the spearhead of the assault on the Ukrainian capital, less than 30 kilometers away.

Douglas Barrie, a military aerospace consultant at the IISS, told Defense News that the vulnerability of attack helicopters, which led to the high casualty rate, prompted a change in tactics by Russian forces, which began using longer-range weapons such as the Kh-39 air-to-ground missile – but losses continued.

What can drones do that helicopters can’t?

Repealing the FARA agreement will potentially free up billions of dollars for investment in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – or simply drones – which many believe, based on the experience in Ukraine, will dramatically change the face of the battlefield.

General Rainey believes that in the immediate future of military aviation, pilots will continue to be in the cockpit. At the FARA announcement, he said, “The requirement to be able to conduct reconnaissance and security is still absolutely valid,” but it depends on “how much risk you are willing to accept.” This will therefore help determine whether a manned or unmanned option is the best solution.

The United States and other countries are focusing their efforts on developing unmanned combat aircraft (UCAVs). These will perform all the functions previously performed by helicopters: intelligence gathering, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, but also carry weapons such as air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW).

These drones are currently controlled by humans in real time, but thanks to the development of artificial intelligence, they will very soon be able to operate semi- or even fully autonomously. Kamikaze drones, which were a plague on the battlefield in Ukraine, will have their place, but it is likely that future generations will also be AI-controlled, propelled from a carrier drone individually or in swarms in a mode the US Army calls “launch effect”.

What about helicopters?

Despite Axe’s dire assessment, rotary-wing aircraft are not dead yet, but the way they are used in the future will and must change. Attack helicopters will become more survivable through the use of longer-range standoff weapons such as those Russia has deployed – in fact, the Air-Launched, Tube-Integrated Unmanned System 700 (Altius 700), a prototype “launch effect” drone disperser currently being tested and mounted on the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. Helicopters can also act as air traffic controllers and relay stations for drones, extending and supplementing their operational range.

Helicopters are likely to play a critical role on the battlefield as logistics and transport platforms, as well as for troop deployments and medical evacuations in hard-to-reach areas – although this role, too, may one day be taken over by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Meanwhile, General Rainey said, “The future will be about who can effectively integrate man and machine.”