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IDF will announce the results of its investigation into October 7 in July

The Israeli military is expected to present the results of its investigation into the October 7 massacre in July.

The investigative teams will present their findings to the Chief of Staff and the Israeli public.

The military investigation should be the basis for a comprehensive investigation by a state commission of inquiry, which has not yet been established due to political obstacles. Only a state commission of inquiry will enable an investigation into the political and military levels, as well as into Israeli intelligence.

Important questions that need to be asked include how the strategic deployment was carried out that ensured the deterrence of Hamas and why, from a tactical point of view, no warning was given before the invasion.

The operational branch of the General Staff

The main question, however, is how such a significant reduction in troops on the Gaza border could be allowed while residents were left to their fate. Another key question is how the defense system worked in the first hours of the attack.

The Israeli Air Force

In the first hours of the attack, the Air Force did not function optimally. It had not prepared for defensive warfare and had not properly assessed the threat in the first hours. According to the testimonies collected since then, the Air Force leadership was so slow and disorganized in the first hours that on October 7, citizens made WhatsApp calls to the only two attack helicopter pilots who were on standby.

Kibbutz Nir Oz after the massacre (Source: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

Another question is why the fighter planes were not launched until the afternoon to end the invasion.

The Navy

While the Navy has made great efforts in its public relations to distance itself from the October 7 failure, it has failed miserably. Naval Intelligence issued no warning about the plans of the Navy commandos to invade Israel.

The sea barrier near Zikim Beach, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars, has not had the desired effect. The Ashdod naval base was not prepared for an attack on October 7. Terror ships managed to land on the beach and carry out a massacre there. Coordination between the naval and ground forces was poor. The question arises whether the navy tried to establish full contact when the terror ships landed on the beach.

Southern Command

The command’s intelligence and operational systems will be examined. The key point to be investigated is why the command’s control mechanisms did not work and did not prevent the invasion. In addition, the question of how the command could allow such a massive reduction in forces in Gaza’s border communities will also be examined. The decision-making during the defensive battle.

The Gaza Division

On the morning of October 7, the division collapsed. The subject of the investigation will be questions about the operational readiness of the division and the management of the defense system.

In addition, the command behavior of the generals and division commanders during the defense will be investigated. This includes the invasion of Kibbutz Be’eri, the conduct of the fighting within the kibbutz, including the battle for Pesi Cohen’s house. In addition, investigations will be carried out in the kibbutzim where there were statements according to which the forces avoided contact with the terrorists, including Nir Oz, Nirim, Kissufim and others.

The investigation in Be’eri will show whether Brigadier General Barak Hiram acted sensibly and appropriately in directing the battle. The focus, as mentioned, is on the direction of the shelling of Psi’s house. As I recall, a tank was ordered to fire two shells at a house where terrorists were holding about twenty Israeli citizens hostage.

Hiram is set to take over as head of the Gaza Division. However, border communities in the Gaza Strip have stated that they will not cooperate with the division if he is appointed.

During the defensive battles in the communities bordering the Gaza Strip, the investigative teams brought to light hundreds of stories of heroism and sacrifice.

On the side of the fighters, officers, policemen, Shin Bet employees and civilians. Heroic stories about rescuing the wounded from the Nova Party and the settlements in the communities bordering Gaza, about direct battles with terrorists, about seeking contact, knowing full well that they may not return from battle.

The Israel Defense Forces must investigate. The Landau Commission, which investigated the functioning of the Shin Bet in the Izzat Nafsu and Line 300 case, made a saying: “A festering wound can only heal in sunlight.”

Today, the Israeli military needs the Israeli summer sun to heal the festering wound that opened up in the fall.